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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS, 2005
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
162 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2005)
Issue: Whether distributors of file sharing software may be held liable for
acts of copyright infringement by third parties using that software.
Holding: A unanimous Court, per Justice Souter, held that "one who distrib-
utes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringe-
ment, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement of third parties." Grokster,
125 S. Ct. at 2770, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 790. The finding of secondary liability was
based on a theory of inducement and the Court declined to revisit its holding in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
The Court said the Sony decision only barred finding secondary liability by
imputing intent to induce infringement by third parties. Where, as here, evi-
dence of such intent exists, liability may found consistent with the Sony rule.
Finding that there was ample evidence to support the claim of copyright in-
fringement, the Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of re-
spondents Grokster.
Discussion: The Court found the evidence in the summary judgment to be
"replete" with instances in which respondents "acted with a purpose to cause
copyright violations by use of software suitable for illegal use." Grokster, 125
S. Ct. at 2781, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 802. First, respondents specifically targeted
former Napster users after that file-sharing service was shut down by court
order. Second, there was no evidence that respondents attempted to mitigate
illegal use of their software. The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing that a lack of an independent duty to monitor their users' activities exoner-
ated respondents because, combined with other evidence of intent, it "under-
scores Grokster's and StreamCast's intentional facilitation of their users' in-
fringement." Id. at 2781, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 802. Third, the Court noted that file-
sharing companies make money from selling advertising and thus have an in-
centive to encourage high-volume use of their software, which encourages the
infringement use the Court already identified. "[V]iewed in the context of the
entire record," this fact strengthened the case against respondents. Id. at 2782,
162 L. Ed. 2d at 803.
Finally, the requirement of actual infringement under the inducement theory
was clearly satisfied because "there [wa]s evidence of infringement on a gigan-
tic scale." Id. at 2782, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 803. Thus, under the inducement the-
ory, the Court found "[t]he unlawful objective" to be "unmistakable." Id. at
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2782, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 803.
The Court emphasized that it had not used a theory of contributory or vi-
carious liability which would have attached liability to the distribution of a
product capable of being used for illegal purposes. Liability was found here by
"inferring a patently illegal objective from statements and actions showing
what that objective was." Id. at 2782, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 803.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy,
concurred in the Court's holding, but wrote separately to explain why, under
Sony, she believed "the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate, beyond
genuine debate, a reasonable prospect that substantial or commercially signifi-
cant noninfringing uses were likely to develop over time." Id. at 2786, 162 L.
Ed. 2d at 808 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, also concurred in
the Court's holding, but wrote separately to express his disagreement with Jus-
tice Ginsburg. He felt that summary judgment in favor of respondents was ap-
propriate and believed "the record reveals a significant future market for non-
infringing uses of Grokster-type peer-to-peer software." Id. at 2789, 162 L. Ed.
2d at 811 (Breyer, J., concurring). Then, Justice Breyer addressed what he
called "the real question": whether the Sony standard should be modified. He
rejected that suggestion and warned that Justice Ginsburg's approach would
place a heavier burden on defendants and "undercut the protection that Sony
now offers."
Summarized by Michael D. Magidson
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.
2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" of
"Commission") classification of broadband cable modem service as an "infor-
mation service" but not as a "telecommunications service" under Title II of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
("Act"), which subjects all providers of "telecommunications service" to man-
datory common-carrier regulation, is a lawful construction of the Telecommu-
nications Act under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. §§ 555 etseq.
Holding: The Court held that broadband cable modem companies are ex-
empt from mandatory common-carrier regulation because the FCC's classifica-
tion of cable modem service as an "information service" rather than a "tele-
communications service" is a lawful construction of the Act under Chevron
and the APA.
Description: The Ninth Circuit held that the FCC could not permissibly con-
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strue the Act to exempt cable companies providing Internet service from Title
II regulation under AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000),
which held that cable modem service was a "telecommunications service."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision because
the AT&T court did not review an administrative proceeding and the FCC was
not a party to the case. Thus, the Ninth Circuit erred by not applying Chevron,
which governs the FCC's interpretation of the Act.
Under Chevron's framework, the FCC can "execute and enforce" as well as
"prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in public interest to
carry out the provisions" of the Act. Ultimately, the FCC has the congressional
authority to resolve statutory ambiguities in a reasonable fashion since it is
better equipped to make different policies choices than the courts.
The FCC previously concluded that cable modem service is an "information
service" because the service only uses the high-speed cable, or telecommunica-
tions, to provide consumers with a comprehensive capability for manipulating
information and using the Internet rather than a "stand-alone, transparent offer-
ing" of such telecommunications. In re Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R.
4798 (March 14, 2002). The dissent argues that the high-speed transmission
component necessary to providing cable modem service is necessarily "of-
fered" with Internet service because cable modem service is like the offering of
pizza delivery service together with pizza. However, the Court maintains that
the dissent's argument only underscores the ambiguity of the term, "offer," and
holds that so long as the FCC's construction is reasonable, the Commission
may rely on its expert policy judgment to resolve the ambiguity. As such, the
Court held that the FCC's conclusion that cable modem service does not offer
the "transparent ability" to transmit information (from the consumer's perspec-
tive) is a reasonable construction.
Finally, the Court rejected MCI, Inc.'s argument that the FCC's treatment of
cable modem services is inconsistent with its treatment of Digital Subscriber
Line ("DSL") service and is therefore an arbitrary and capricious deviation
from agency policy under the APA. The Court held that the FCC is free within
the limits of reasoned interpretation to justify inconsistent treatment between
cable modem service and DSL service. The Court expressed no further view
regarding this matter and asserted that any inconsistency between the order
under review and the FCC's treatment of DSL service will be adequately ad-
dressed when the FCC fully reconsiders the issue.
Summarized by George Wang
Am. Library Ass'n Inc. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
Issue: Whether Congress delegated authority to the Federal Communica-
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tions Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 ("Act"), to regulate an apparatus
that can receive television broadcasts but the apparatus is itself not engaged in
the process of receiving a broadcast transmission.
Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found that the Commission acted outside the scope of its delegated authority
when it adopted regulations requiring digital television receivers and other de-
vices capable of receiving digital television broadcast signals, manufactured on
or after July 1, 2005, to include technology that would recognize "broadcast
flags." The court found that the FCC never possessed ancillary jurisdiction
under the Act, or subsequent congressional legislation, to regulate consumer
electronic devices that can be used for receipt of wire or radio communication
when the devices are not engaged in the process of radio or wire transmission.
The Commission's Order was reversed and vacated insofar as it requires de-
modulator products manufactured on or after July 1, 2005 to recognize and
give effect to the broadcast flag.
Description: This case represents an attempt by the FCC to establish far-
reaching influence concurrent with the nation's upcoming transition from an
analog transmission standard to a digital transmission standard, commonly
known as digital television ("DTV"). Of specific concern to the Commission is
the increased potential for rapid and widespread unauthorized copying and re-
distribution of digital content that may result due to the widespread switch to
DTV.
In response to these concerns, in November 2003, the Commission "adopted
regulations aimed at requiring demodulator products manufactured on or after
July 1, 2005 to recognize and give effect to the broadcast flag." In re Digital
Broadcast Content Protection, Report and Order and Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,570, 23,576, 23,590-91 (Nov. 4,
2003) ("Order"). A broadcast flag, or Redistribution Control Descriptor, is "a
digital code embedded in a digital broadcasting stream, which prevents digital
television reception equipment from redistributing digital broadcast content."
In order to make this content-protective measure effective, the signal must be
flagged and the receiver decoding the signal must recognize and give effect to
the flag.
The petition for review challenged the FCC's Order on three grounds: "(1)
the Commission lacked statutory authority to mandate that demodulator prod-
ucts recognize and give effect to the broadcast flag; (2) the broadcast flag re-
gime impermissibly conflicted with copyright law; and (3) the Commission's
decision was arbitrary and capricious for want of reasoned decisionmaking."
As the court noted, it is "axiomatic" that an administrative agency's policy
considerations are due deference only when they are reasonably made pursuant
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to a legislative grant of authority. The court cites to the "familiar" Chev-
ron/Mead line of Supreme Court precedent as the source of the standard for
judicial review of administrative policy. Short of an exercise of expressly
granted statutory authority, the Commission must rely upon its "ancillary juris-
diction." As delineated by three Supreme Court cases-United States v. S. W.
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406
U.S. 649 (1972), and FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979)-
such ancillary jurisdiction can only be invoked by the Commission in a situa-
tion where the regulation seeking to be promulgated is under the general grant
of jurisdiction under Title I of the Act and is reasonably ancillary to the effec-
tive performance of the Commission's various responsibilities as delegated to
it by Congress.
The court followed the standard Chevron/Mead analysis, stating that the
Commission did not rely on its authority under a specific legislative grant of
authority. As such, these regulations were adopted pursuant solely to the
FCC's ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the Act.
In exercising this ancillary jurisdiction, the Commission found that
(I) television receivers are covered by Title I's general jurisdictional grant even when those
receivers are not engaged in the process of communication by wire or radio and (2) flag-
based regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's regulatory authority to fos-
ter a diverse range of broadcast television programs and promote the transition from analog
service to DTV.
Despite the FCC's arguments that their broadcast flag regulations were a
reasonable application of the agency's ancillary authority under the Communi-
cations Act, the court found that they did satisfy an all-important threshold
consideration: whether the agency acted pursuant to delegated authority. Under
Title I of the Act, and as clarified by the Supreme Court in Midwest Video, the
Commission has authority to assert jurisdiction over an entity engaged in
"communication by wire or radio." The court found that the Commission's
general jurisdictional grant under Title I "plainly encompasses the regulation
of apparatus that can receive television broadcast content, but only while those
apparatus are engaged in the process of receiving a television broadcast . . .
[not] after a transmission is complete." The broadcast flag code, the court con-
cluded, only affects the apparatus after the initial transmission is complete,
preventing it from being able to retransmit or transfer digital content. Conse-
quently, the broadcast flag regulations fall outside of the authority granted to
the Commission by Congress under the Act.
Finally, the court concluded that subsequent legislation "confirms the lim-
ited scope of the agency's ancillary jurisdiction and makes it clear that the
broadcast flag regulations exceed the agency's delegated authority under the
statute."
Summarized by Andrew Smith
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APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 418 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir.
2005)
Issue: Whether Chapter 5 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b, creates a private right of action for an owner or opera-
tor of a payphone service provider to recover from an interexchange carrier the
compensation for coinless payphone calls required by a regulation of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("Commission").
Holding: Although aggregators had standing to sue the defendant interex-
change carriers for failing to pay the payphone service providers dial-around
compensation-which payphone service providers receive for completed calls
that are not paid for by coin-they did not have the right to sue in federal court
to recover the compensation. The interexchange carriers' motion to dismiss
was granted.
Discussion: APCCS and several other aggregators brought suit on behalf of
payphone service providers to recover compensation for dial-around service
owed by interexchange carriers pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of
1996 ("Act"). The Act required that payphone service providers be fairly com-
pensated for intrastate and interstate calls made with their payphones pursuant
to 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A). The defendants, Sprint, AT&T, and other interex-
change carriers, moved to dismiss the cases, claiming that the aggregators
lacked standing to sue. The district court denied the motion for AT&T and Ca-
ble & Wireless, and allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to assert
that §§ 201(b), 407, and 416(c) of Title 47 provide alternative grounds for re-
lief. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated the appeals.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered
whether Chapter 5 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-615b, creates a private right of action for an owner or operator of a
payphone, a payphone service provider, to recover from an interexchange car-
rier the compensation for coinless payphone calls required by a regulation of
the Federal Communications Commission. The court of appeals held that there
is no private right of action of a payphone service provider to recover from an
interexchange carrier based on § 276 of the Communications Act. In reaching
this conclusion, the court of appeals first considered the issue of whether the
plaintiff aggregators had standing to sue on behalf of the payphone service
providers. Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), the court deter-
mined that the assignment of the payphone service providers to the aggregators
to sue on their behalf was valid since the assignments could not be revoked
without written consent of the aggregator and further held that the assignee's
conduct with respect to the recovery is immaterial.
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In reaching the issue of whether § 276 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 creates a private right of action, the court deferred to the decision in
Greene v. Sprint Communications Co., 340 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2003), concur-
ring that § 276 does not contain any "rights-creating language" and as a result,
interexchange carriers are not regulated by that section and therefore, could not
have violated that provision. However, the court held that interexchange carri-
ers violated a regulation issued by the Commission, but did not violate Chapter
5. The court further noted that the Commission never specified an interex-
change carrier's failure to compensate payphone service providers for the dial
around service as "unjust and unreasonable" pursuant to § 201(b) of the Act in
its 1999 Order. In response to plaintiffs' contention that the compensation
regulation is an "order" within the meaning of § 416(c), the court held that the
order only refers to adjudicatory and not rulemaking decisions. Therefore,
plaintiffs were not provided a right to private action via §§ 206 and 207. Rely-
ing on the First Circuit decision in New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of Maine, 742 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984), the court
noted that making §§ 407 and 416(c) applicable to Commission regulations
would interfere with the Commission's ability to enforce the Communications
Act.
Summarized by Behnaz Lavian
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir.
2005),petition for reh'g en banc denied, 405 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert
denied sub nom. Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977, 162 L. Ed. 2d 906
(2005)
Issue: Whether journalists enjoy a testimonial privilege allowing them to re-
fuse to identify a source when subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury.
Holding: Neither the First Amendment nor federal common law provides
journalists with the privilege to refuse to identify before a grand jury a source
who is, or may be, engaged in criminal activity.
Discussion: Journalists Matt Cooper (along with his employer, Time, Inc.)
and Judith Miller were subpoenaed by Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald
regarding contacts they had with a government official concerning the leak of
the Central Intelligence Agency operative's identity. They appealed a civil
contempt order issued by the district court for refusing to testify before a grand
jury and claimed that the identities of their sources are protected by the First
Amendment, and in the alternative, a journalists' privilege.
The court of appeals disposed of the First Amendment argument based on
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The District of Columbia Circuit
refused to revisit the question determining, "Unquestionably, the Supreme
Court decided in Branzburg that there is no First Amendment privilege protect-
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ing journalists from appearing before a grand jury .... " Miller, 397 F.3d at
970.
The court rejected petitioners' claim that the confidentiality of their sources
was protected by a journalists' privilege. Petitioners argued such a privilege
was consistent with congressional intent, expressed in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 501, allowing federal courts to recognize new testimonial privileges.
The majority opinion then determined, without deciding whether such a privi-
lege existed, that the government in this case had presented enough evidence to
overcome any such privilege.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sentelle found it strange to "reach the quan-
tum question in the absence of a determination as to the existence of the privi-
lege" and reasoned that since Branzburg no such federal common law privilege
has arisen. Miller, 397 F.3d at 977. Judge Henderson, also concurring, felt the
court need not decide the existence of a federal privilege, finding that "the
Special Counsel's evidentiary proffer overcomes any hurdle, however high."
Miller, 397 F.3d at 982. The final concurrence by Judge Tatel did recognize a
federal common law journalistic privilege although he agreed the Special
Counsel had overcome any privilege.
Finally, the court rejected petitioners' two procedural claims, finding (1) ex
parte filings by the Special Counsel lawfully maintained the secrecy of grand
jury proceedings; and (2) Department of Justice administrative subpoena
guidelines explicitly denied creating a legally enforceable right in a third party.
Summarized by Shawn M MeMahon
Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
Issue: In 2004, the FCC issued the Auction of Direct Broadcast Satellite Li-
censes order ("DBS Auction Order"). In re Auction of Direct Broadcast Satel-
lite Licenses, Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 820 (Jan. 5, 2004). The DBS Auction Order
concluded that § 647 of the Open-market Reorganization for the Betterment of
International Telecommunications Act ("ORBIT Act") did not prohibit the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") from auc-
tioning DBS spectrum. Northpoint Technology filed a petition for review with
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the FCC's inter-
pretation of the ORBIT Act. Section 647 of the ORBIT Act prohibits the FCC
from auctioning satellite spectrum that is international in use. The court was
asked to review whether the FCC's distinction between international and do-
mestic satellite service in the DBS Auction Order was proper considering it
was inconsistent with the Commission's earlier report and order in Amend-
ment to the Commission's Regulatory Policies Governing Domestic Fixed Sat-
ellites & Separate International Satellite Systems, Report and Order, II
F.C.C.R. 2429 (Jan. 19, 1996) ("DISCO I").
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Holding: The court reviewed the FCC's interpretation under the Chevron
doctrine and found the FCC's decision arbitrary and capricious. The court held
that the FCC's ORBIT Act rulemaking was inconsistent with the FCC's prior
ruling on the subject in DISCO I. In DISCO I the FCC trivialized the distinc-
tion between international and domestic satellite service. However, in the DBS
Auction Order, the Commission assumed that the distinction was severe. The
disparity between domestic and international was critical in allowing the FCC
to auction DBS spectrum in light of § 647 of the ORBIT Act's prohibition on
auctioning satellite spectrum that is for international use. The Commission in
the DBS Auction Order gave no explanation for the deviation from its state-
ments on the distinction between international and domestic satellite spectrum
use in DISCO I. Therefore, the court vacated part III.A of the DBS Auction
Order and remanded to the FCC for further rulemaking.
Discussion: The court began to dance "the Chevron two-step" by taking
Northpoint's lead on step one and found that the statute clearly forbid the FCC
from auctioning all DBS spectrum, both domestic and international. However,
the court held that Congress had missed a beat when drafting § 647. The text of
§ 647 prohibits the FCC from auctioning "spectrum used for the provision of
international or global satellite communications service." Since a literal inter-
pretation would precondition the auction prohibition based on the outcome of
the auction itself, the court found that the statute's meaning was ambiguous.
Finding Congress out-of-tune, the court played on.
The court then took the lead and waltzed Northpoint over to step two of the
Chevron analysis: determining whether the FCC's interpretation of the am-
biguous statute was arbitrary and capricious. Here it found the FCC had lost its
rhythm. The Commission had developed a record in its DISCO I rulemaking
that suggested the distinction between domestic and international DBS service
was not the same tune they were playing now. In interpreting § 647 of the Or-
bit Act, the FCC claimed that there was a distinction between international and
domestic DBS service. Thus it could auction spectrum for domestic DBS ser-
vice even though it was prohibited from doing so with international DBS ser-
vice.
The FCC may now regret the decisions made in the DISCO I era (finding
the distinction between international and domestic service minimal), but it
cannot ignore them. Indeed, for the Commission's interpretation of § 647 to
strike the right chord, it must acknowledge DISCO I's findings and explain
why DISCO I is dead. While the court believed the FCC's current interpreta-
tion of § 647 to have a good beat, it couldn't dance to it. The ORBIT rulemak-
ing's explanation of DISCO I was off-beat; and while DISCO I may have been
off-key, that precedent had to be acknowledged and distinguished before the




Summarized by Patrick Murck
United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005)
Issue: Whether Bradford Councilman's interception of e-mail messages in
temporary, transient electronic storage constitutes an offense under the Wiretap
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
Holding: The court held that the Wiretap Act's electronic communication
term does encompass transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the com-
munication process. Therefore, intercepting e-mail messages that are in the
transient state is an offense under the Wiretap Act. The First Circuit found that
the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss and re-
manded the case for further proceedings consistent with the First Circuit's
opinion.
Discussion: Interloc, Inc., is an online rare book listing service. As vice-
president of Interloc, Inc., Bradford C. Councilman managed the company's e-
mail service and book dealer subscription list. In January 1998, Councilman's
indictment alleges that Councilman instructed Interloc employees to intercept
and copy all incoming e-mails to the book dealers from Amazon.com. The In-
terloc computer system was set up to copy the Amazon.com incoming mes-
sages to a separate file for Councilman's access. This process enabled Coun-
cilman to read e-mail messages sent to the Interloc subscribers prior to their
receipt of the e-mail messages.
Councilman claimed that the system was capturing electronic storage, not
electronic communications. Technically speaking, when a subscriber hits the
send button on his composed e-mail, the message becomes formatted through a
mail transfer agent ("MTA"). The MTA then sends the message to another
program that "packetizes" it. From there, the message enters the Internet. In a
matter of seconds, this packetized message is sent to many intermediary com-
puters before reaching its final destination. The intermediary computers often
keep backup copies if they cannot deliver the packetized message immediately.
This system is called "store and forward" delivery.
Councilman argued that Congress defined electronic storage as "any tempo-
rary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to
the electronic transmission thereof." United States v. Councilman, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 319 (D. Mass. 2003). The district court granted Councilman's motion
to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to violate the Wiretap Act, finding that the
messages Councilman intercepted were not electronic communications under
the Wiretap Act. A divided First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision,
holding that the Wiretap Act's definition of electronic communication does not
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include electronic storage; therefore, intercepting electronic storage is not a
violation of the Wiretap Act. The United States' petition for a rehearing en
banc was granted by the full bench of the First Circuit.
The case hinged on the interpretation of the Wiretap Act, as amended by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
("ECPA"). In determining whether "electronic communication" as broadly
defined in the Wiretap Act included "electronic storage," the court first looked
to the plain meaning of the statute. The Wiretap Act provides definitions for
both "wire communication" and "electronic communication." The former's
definition includes electronic storage while the latter's definition does not.
However, in promulgating a definition for "electronic communication" in the
ECPA, Congress provided four exceptions, of which, electronic storage is not
enumerated. The court, in rejecting Councilman's argument that "electronic
storage" is an exception, referenced that "[w]here Congress explicitly enumer-
ates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to
be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent."
Unable to discern a judgment from the plain meaning of the statute, the
court then looked to the legislative history of the Wiretap Act and the ECPA.
The "electronic storage" clause was added to the "wire communication" defini-
tion to include voice-mail. The inclusion of "electronic storage" was to put this
stored wire communication into the purview of the Wiretap Act, rather than the
Stored Communications Act (which protected the backup communications and
facilities that housed the backup). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712. The court further
found that when Congress added "electronic storage" to "wire communication"
they did not contemplate excluding storage in the definition of "electronic
communication."
The court said Congress purposefully defined "electronic communication"
in a broad manner to provide remedies for persons whose computers were
hacked. The statute was looking to protect the e-mail files that were left behind
on a person's computer, in addition to protecting the files for the brief instants
when a message becomes stored on intermediary computers en route to its des-
tination. The court found that the legislative history of the Wiretap Act and the
ECPA did not indicate any type of exclusionary discussions of storage from
the definition of "electronic communication." Therefore, because of the broad
"electronic communication" definition in the Wiretap Act as amended by the
ECPA, the court ruled that a person who intercepts an e-mail that is in transient
electronic storage violates the Wiretap Act.
Summarized by Carol Cahill
Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005)
Issue: Whether an order by the dean of a publicly-funded university that
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withdraws financial support from a subsidized student newspaper unless all
articles are approved in advance of publication violates constitutional rights to
free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment; and if so, whether the dean is
entitled to qualified immunity for this violation.
Holding: The court applied the Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988), framework for free speech analysis to evaluate whether
regulation of collegiate speech is permitted. It determined that the articles in
the Innovator were made by speakers in a public forum, and it is unconstitu-
tional for public officials to censor speech in a designated public forum. Then
the court, sitting en banc, reversed its prior decision and held that the dean was
entitled to qualified immunity.
Discussion: The Innovator is the subsidized student newspaper of Governors
State University, located in Illinois. The newspaper is published by a Board
which consists of four students, two faculty members, and one employee of the
university. The Board's policy is that each funded publication "will determine
content and format.., without censorship or advance approval."
Nonetheless, Dean of Student Affairs and Services, Patricia Carter, required
such approval after the Innovator published several articles attacking the integ-
rity of specific members of the administration. As a result of Carter's order, the
Innovator ceased publication in November 2000. This civil action for depriva-
tion of rights was brought by members of the editorial staff, and the dean ap-
peals from a prior ruling of this court which determined that she did not have
protection from liability under qualified immunity.
In determining whether the dean's order violated free speech rights, the
court applied the legal framework from Hazelwood, which held that faculty
may supervise and determine the content of a high school student newspaper
based on "legitimate pedagogical concerns." Whereas the district court held
that this decision is limited to high school students, this court held that Hazel-
wood's framework "applies to subsidized student newspapers at colleges as
well as elementary and secondary schools." As in a high school setting, the
court held officials are justified in reviewing the content of a subsidized stu-
dent newspaper in a collegiate setting because of the desire to "ensure high
standards for the student speech that is disseminated under [the school's] aus-
pices."
Hazelwood also distinguishes between speech in a public forum and speech
in a non-public forum to address the question of whether plaintiffs have as-
serted a legitimate constitutional claim. Though speech in a non-public forum
"may be open to reasonable regulation even at the college level-or later," if
the university newspaper created a public forum for the reporter's speech, then
public officials are precluded from censoring that speech. Although the Inno-
vator did not participate in a "traditional public forum," the university created
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a medium of "designated public forum" or "limited purpose public forum"
when it established a subsidized student newspaper under the Board. Taking
the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court determined that
the dean's conduct violated rights to free speech.
When evidence presented to the court makes out a constitutional claim, the
court must then inquire whether the official enjoys qualified immunity for such
a violation. Qualified immunity shields an official from suit whenever he or
she "reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances" at issue.
This protection extends to decisions that are "constitutionally deficient." Prior
to this court's application of the Hazelwood framework to a university setting,
the law governing review and approval of collegiate speech by university offi-
cials was not clearly established. Thus, the court found it "inappropriate to
say" that a reasonable person in Dean Carter's position in November 2000
would definitely have known that the order to the Innovator to submit issues
for review or have financial support cut off violated the First Amendment.
Dean Carter was entitled to qualified immunity, and was protected from liabil-
ity in damages.
Though the Innovator enjoyed free speech by virtue of its participation in a
public forum, this court's application of the Hazelwood legal framework to a
university setting has the potential to restrict First Amendment protection in
venues of collegiate speech found elsewhere. The dynamic of this potential
issue is first evident in the majority opinion: "Academic freedom includes the
authority of the university to manage an academic community ... free from
interference by . . . the courts." The dissent counters: "Restrictions on free
speech have no place in the world of college and graduate school," calling the
college classroom the "marketplace of ideas."
Having determined that the Innovator participated in a public forum, the
court found that Dean Carter violated the First Amendment by withholding
printing funds for the paper if its articles had not been approved in advance.
Because the law on the issue of freedom of collegiate speech was unsettled,
Dean Carter was entitled to qualified immunity. The prior decision of the court
of appeals was reversed.
Summarized by Chris Nolin
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005)
Issue: An appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri presented several issues: whether the state law claims for breach of
contract were preempted by the federal Copyright Act; whether the use of re-
verse engineering constituted a violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA"); and whether the interoperability exception to the DMCA ap-
plies to the circumvention technology at issue in this case.
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Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and found: the
Copyright Act did not preempt the plaintiffs state law breach of contract
claims; the defendants' reverse engineering violated both the anti-
circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA; and the interop-
erability exception to the DMCA was not applicable.
Discussion: The plaintiff, Davidson & Associates, doing business as Bliz-
zard Entertainment ("Blizzard"), creates and distributes gaming software for
use on personal computers. Using reverse engineering, the defendants created a
program that enabled its users to circumvent Blizzard's piracy prevention con-
trols. Users of the defendants' program, which was available on the defen-
dants' website, were able to experience certain aspects of Blizzard games oth-
erwise only available to purchasers of the games from Blizzard. The plaintiff
filed claims against the defendants for breach of contract, circumvention of
copyright protection system, and trafficking in circumvention technology.
On appeal, the defendants argued that breach of contract claims were pre-
empted by the federal Copyright Act. The case concerned conflict preemption,
which applies when it is impossible to comply with both the state and federal
law or when the state law frustrates the purposes of the federal law. The Copy-
right Act allows owners of computer programs to make adaptations to the pro-
gram for interoperability purposes. Defendants argued that state law, which
allows parties to waive their rights to adapt programs, conflicts with the federal
law. The court of appeals disagreed, and held that there was no preemption.
Citing other cases, the court ruled that the Copyright Act does not preempt a
breach of contract action based on prohibited acts contained in a licensing
agreement. In this case, the defendants had agreed to both the Terms of Use
and End User Licensing Agreements, and thereby relinquished their rights to
reverse engineer.
Next, the court considered the claims that the reverse engineering violated
provisions in the DMCA. The anti-circumvention provision of the act prohibits
a person from "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively con-
trols access to a work protected under [copyright law]." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)
(2000). The anti-trafficking provisions of the act focuses on the trafficking in
of circumvention technology. Id. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b)(1). The court of appeals
held that the defendants had violated all three provisions.
Finally, the court considered the defendants' argument that the interoperabil-
ity exception to the DMCA applied. One of the exceptions to the DMCA's
prohibition of the use of circumvention technology is for those who use such
technology "for the sole purpose" of trying to achieve interoperability of com-
puter programs through reverse engineering. Id. § 1201(f). In order to use the
interoperability defense, one must show that (1) they lawfully obtained the
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right to use a copy of the computer program; (2) the person engaging in the.
circumvention did not previously have the information gathered through the
reverse engineering process; (3) the sole purpose of the reverse engineering
was to achieve interoperability between the circumvented program and other
programs; and (4) the circumvention did not constitute infringement. Id. The
court of appeals found that the defendants' circumvention constituted in-
fringement, and therefore the interoperability defense did not apply to them. As
a result, summary judgment in favor of Blizzard was proper.
Summarized by Tracy DeJesus
Metrophones Telecomms., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc.,
423 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2005)
Issue: Whether a payphone service provider ("PSP") may sue a long-
distance carrier to recover compensation for "dial-around" coinless calls that
the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") regulations obligate the
long-distance carrier to pay.
Holding: The court held that a PSP may sue a long-distance carrier to re-
cover compensation for calls that FCC regulations obligate the carrier to pay.
Discussion: In its ruling, the court reversed an earlier Ninth Circuit decision,
Greene v. Sprint Communications Co., 340 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2003), in which
it held that a PSP may not sue long-distance carriers for dial-around compensa-
tion under a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 ("Act"). However, since Greene, the FCC has inter-
preted § 201(b) of the Act to allow PSPs to proceed with such actions against
long-distance carriers. In light of this development, the court deferred to the
FCC's "reasonable, authoritative interpretation of that statute."
Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984), courts engage in a two-step analysis in order to de-
termine the level of deference to give to an agency's interpretation of a statute.
First, if the statute unambiguously expresses the intent of Congress, then the
courts are bound to give effect to the clearly stated congressional intent. If
congressional intent is ambiguous, a court proceeds to step two of the Chevron
analysis and will defer to an agency's interpretation so long as the agency's
statutory construction is "a reasonable policy choice to make" and not "arbi-
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844, 845. Pursu-
ant to § 201(b), the FCC may engage in rulemaking to address industry prac-
tices that are "unjust or unreasonable." In its analysis of § 201(b), the court
determined that congressional intent regarding what practices were deemed
"unjust or unreasonable" was ambiguous and, thus, step two of the Chevron
analysis was necessary. Under step two, the court determined that the FCC's
rule-that failure to pay a PSP dial-around compensation was unjust-was a
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reasonable interpretation of § 201(b). Further, the court determined the FCC's
interpretation that Congress intended for private actions to be available to rem-
edy such violations was also a reasonable, authoritative interpretation of §
20 1(b).
Summarized by James Weiss
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 F.
Supp. 2d 945 (M.D.N.C. 2005)
Issue: Whether, pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), subpoenas obtained by the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") forcing two universities to identify two copyright infring-
ing individuals who accessed the Internet through the universities' networks
are valid.
Holding: Section 512(h) of the DMCA did not authorize the issuance of
subpoenas to two universities acting as Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")
when those universities acted only as conduits for the transmission of infring-
ing materials. Additionally, the court, relying heavily upon the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit's 2003 holding in Recording Industry Ass 'n ofAmerica, Inc. v.
Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), interpreted the
subpoena issuance language of § 512(h) to require the issuance of the sub-
poena to be from the jurisdiction in which the alleged violation occurred.
Description: Pursuant to the DMCA, the RIAA served subpoenas on the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ("UNC") and North Carolina State
University ("NC State"), to identify individuals who were using their networks
to infringe copyrights of the association's members. The two unnamed indi-
viduals identified in the subpoenas intervened, as John Doe and Jane Doe, and
moved to quash the subpoenas. After initially cooperating with the RIAA, the
universities filed their own motions to quash. With the constitutionality and
applicability of the DMCA directly challenged, the U.S. government inter-
vened as well. The court, having received all motions, granted John Doe and
Jane Doe's motions to quash the subpoenas.
Interveners presented statutory, procedural, and constitutional arguments in
favor of their motions to quash. Because the court found the intervener's statu-
tory and procedural arguments dispositive, no ruling on the constitutionality of
the DMCA was necessary.
First, interveners argued that § 512(h) of the DMCA did not authorize the
issuance of subpoenas to ISPs that functioned "solely as a conduit for commu-
nications." The court's statutory reading turned on whether a party alleging
infringement must first notify the ISP of such activity before resorting to a
subpoena. The RIAA, responding to the Does' statutory interpretation argu-
ments, urged the court to look beyond a plain reading of the statute and con-
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sider Congress' intention to curtail copyright infringement over the Internet.
The court, however, was unmoved by the RIAA's exhortations and felt guided
by the District of Columbia Circuit's recent holding in Recording Industry
Ass 'n of America. In that case, the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the
same section of the DMCA to require an ISP's notification of infringing activ-
ity on its servers before a subpoena ordering identification of infringing parties
could be issued. Unlike the court in Recording Industry Ass 'n ofAmerica, this
court did not reach the issue as to whether notification was practically possible,
given the transitory nature of infringement, because no notification was ever
sought in this case.
Second, the court felt it necessary to touch upon intervener Jane Doe's ar-
gument that the court's issuance of a subpoena as applied to her was improper
on jurisdictional grounds. Ms. Doe was alleged to have infringed copyright
while at N.C. State, which is located in the Eastern District of North Carolina,
not the Middle District. An issue of first impression as to the DMCA, the court
was asked to determine whether § 512(h) allows for the issuance of a subpoena
by any district court on any person within the United States, regardless of
venue. Intervener argued that the 28 U.S.C. § 1391 was controlling. Section
512(h) reads, in relevant part, that any copyright holder or agent "may request
the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena." Looking to
the Supreme Court's holding in U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988), the court distinguished between na-
tionwide service of process and the issues of jurisdiction and venue. Seeing in
§ 512(h) no explicit grant of subpoena authority, regardless of venue, the court
noted, "[B]ecause of the potential for misuse, it is unlikely Congress would
have granted such sweeping jurisdiction without discussion." Thus, the court
held the issuance of a subpoena against Ms. Doe invalid based on jurisdictional
grounds.
Summarized by Michael Mullin
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